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Governance and Moderation in Online Communities of Consumption:   
A Framework for Community Management 
 
Abstract 
Although governance is a vibrant field of study, to date there exists no framework to classify 
governance mechanisms in Online Communities of Consumption (OCC). As a result knowledge 
on the topic is highly fragmented. To address this, the article presents a framework inspired by 
theory developed in other governance domains and encompassing three main governance 
systems (market, hierarchy, and clan), and their associated moderation activities (relationship 
initiation, relationship maintenance, and relationship termination). Discussion of the framework 
then identifies the major contingencies that influence the functioning of governance systems. The 
framework enables practitioners and academics alike to better understand the social and 
economic mechanisms at play in OCC, and to align community management activities according 
to the specific goals they set. The article concludes with a discussion of limitations, together with 
directions for future research. 
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Governance and Moderation in Online Communities of Consumption:  




In their 2009 Harvard Business Review article, Fournier and Lee bust a number of misleading 
myths that surround the management of online communities of consumption (OCC). At the root 
of those myths is the fallacy that communities are homogeneous. Participation goals and social 
roles are more varied than usually acknowledged, Fournier and Lee argue, and this diversity 
should be embraced rather than limited because “communities are strongest when everyone plays 
a role” (2009, p. 109). Consequently, “smart companies [should] embrace the conflicts that 
makes communities thrive” (2009, p. 108) and engage with all members rather than only opinion 
leaders and evangelists (2009, p. 109). In the article, diversity emerges as an integral part of 
OCC life and is shown to develop into an asset instead of a burden if it is appropriately managed. 
However the question of how diversity can be managed remains largely unanswered. Fournier 
and Lee, thus, refer to one of the key challenges that OCC and their managers face, i.e., “how to 
coordinate the actions of individuals to achieve collective outcomes” (O’Mahonny & Ferraro, 
2007). In other words, how to align the interests of various community stakeholders with those 
of the group. This article investigates the (social) control mechanisms, or governance systems, by 
which OCC regulate the social dilemmas arising from members’ differential interests and roles.  
 
Beyond Fournier and Lee’s discussion of brand communities, OCC governance systems have 
attracted interest across a wide range of social dilemmas and research contexts. Lampe and 
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Johnston (2005) investigated how feedback can balance new members’ motivation to contribute 
with information overload in a news forum community. Wiertz, Mathwick, de Ruyter, and 
Dellaert (2010) examined the effect of feedback mechanisms on peer-to-peer problem-solving 
free-riding behavior, whereby members consume communal knowledge without contributing to 
its production. O’Mahony and Ferraro (2007) analyzed how different forms of authority help 
open-source communities coordinate interdependent members and co-produce software in the 
group. Forte, Larco, and Bruckman (2009) studied how Wikipedia (peer-production community) 
policies and social norms enabled resolution of conflicts between contributors about the 
encyclopedia articles’ content, allowing communal work to flourish. Fairfield (2008) argued 
how, in virtual worlds, contract law should be replaced by common law to avoid citizens’ 
defamation, harassment and defraud, and protect citizens’ fundamental rights, a necessary public 
good. In communities of transaction, Gilkeson and Reynolds (2003) identified which auction 
pricing mechanisms enable the completion of successful, mutually beneficial auctions for the 
two parties and Campbell, Fletcher, and Greenhill (2009) examined conflict between members of 
a trading forum, and its influence on group identity construction. Cheng and Vassileva (2006) 
investigated which member reward systems in communities of learning are best for reaching a 
critical mass of communal knowledge and creating common good while avoiding information 
overload. The OCC governance systems identified in this diverse range of studies operate at 
various levels and address control mechanisms that are specific to the community contexts and 
social dilemmas investigated. As a result, knowledge developed thus far regarding OCC 
governance is highly fragmented and a general, unified framework providing a holistic view of 
the social control mechanisms in OCC is currently lacking.  
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To address this gap in the literature, this article (1) offers a typology of governance structures 
regulating behaviors in OCC, and (2) articulates how each governance structure is transformed 
into practical moderation strategies. In addition, this study highlights major contingencies 
determining which governance structures and moderation strategies should be adopted in 
particular situations, to aid practitioners and future researchers. To date, this represents the first 
study to offer this holistic framework of OCC governance and moderation.  
  
The OCC governance framework presented here is based on a wide range of literature, including 
B2B channels literature, wherein much governance theory has been developed. Although the 
OCC context generates particular solutions to social dilemmas, the article shows that collating 
this diverse literature allows for the development of a coherent vocabulary that gives clear 
indication of how theoretical and practical concepts of OCC governance relate to each other. 
This will allow OCC members and managers to make better informed decisions about 
governance strategies and practices. This integration of literature also allows for clear 
identification of gaps in knowledge to guide future research. 
 
The rest of the article is organized as follows. First, OCC governance structures and their 
relevant implementation mechanisms are defined and organized into a typology, to elucidate 
which fundamental social control mechanisms regulate behaviors in OCC. Second, applied 
governance, or moderation, and its dimensions are defined in an OCC context. This illustrates 
what is required to influence social control mechanisms within OCC. During the subsequent 
discussion, the study’s contribution, major contingencies relating to the OCC governance 
framework, and limitations, are presented in order to motivate further research in this area.  




Governance Structures in Online Communities of Consumption 
 
A variety of rules and enforcement mechanisms orienting individual behavior in OCC have been 
described but, currently, a unified framework of governance structures in OCC does not exist. 
This is problematic as it hinders not only the development of sound knowledge on the topic, but 
community management as well. In contrast, researchers in a variety of fields, including 
institutional economics, organization theory, law, and sociology, have developed typologies of 
governance, mapping the different forms of control (e.g., Bradach & Eccles, 1989; MacNeil, 
1978; Ouchi, 1979; Williamson, 1975). These studies further inspired channel marketing 
researchers to examine governance in the field of marketing (e.g., Heide, 1994). The purpose of 
this section is to establish whether existing governance theory can be used to organize the 
different forms of OCC governance found in the literature. 
 
Researchers typically treat governance as a structure, a set of rules defining appropriate behavior, 
and mechanisms to enforce those rules (Ellickson, 1987). A review of definitions indicates that 
researchers largely refer to the same three archetypal governance structures, but use different 
terminology because of their perspectives. The terms used are market governance (Heide, 1994; 
Ouchi, 1979; Williamson, 1975), also referred to as bilateral governance (Williamson, 1979) and 
price (Bradach & Eccles, 1989); hierarchy governance (Williamson, 1985), also referred to as 
bureaucratic governance (Ouchi, 1979), unified governance (Williamson, 1979), unilateral 
governance (Heide, 1994) and authority (Bradach & Eccles, 1989); and clan governance (Ouchi, 
1979), also referred to as bilateral governance (Heide, 1994) and hybrid governance 
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(Williamson, 1975). These archetypal governance structures can be distinguished based on the 
following; (1) specific control mechanisms representing a type of rule and form of enforcement; 
(2) assumptions about the goal they serve, the type of interaction they entail, and the context in 
which they occur; and, (3) the theoretical framework in which they have been developed (see 
Table 1).   
 
A review of the literature theorizing online community governance and social influence in OCC 
was conducted. For a review of the literature used, see Appendix 1. This systematic review 
reveals that the offline trichotomy can be used to typify governance structures operating in OCC. 
In the following section, the trichotomy developed in the offline, inter-organizational context, 
and its subsequent application to OCC, is discussed. 
 
Typology of Offline Governance Structures 
 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
 
Market governance explains the control mechanism of marketplaces and is rooted in micro-
economic theory. The assumption underlying the principle of market governance is that market 
agents interact with each other by means of transactions (i.e. products or services are exchanged 
in return for money). The aim is value maximization. The rules of market governance are, thus, 
transaction rules. There are two types of transaction rules. The first is the rule of reciprocity. This 
states that a market agent who has received an item of a certain value needs to reciprocate by 
giving something of similar value to the sender. The second is the rule of exchange rate. This 
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defines the value of one item (e.g., a good) in comparison to another (e.g., money) (Ouchi, 
1979). Transaction rules are enforced through negotiation between market agents. 
 
Hierarchy governance explains the control mechanisms that operate in formal organizations in 
which a hierarchical structure determines who has power over whom. This type of governance 
structure encapsulates power dependency theory, which assumes that many relationships 
between members in an organization are unbalanced and unilateral due to differing levels of 
power linked to members’ formal positions (Heide, 1994). This power imbalance encourages the 
stronger party to impose authoritarian rules upon the weaker party. Authoritarian rules are 
arbitrary standards defined unilaterally by the stronger party. They specify what should be done 
by the weaker party to complete a required task satisfactorily (Ouchi, 1979). These rules are 
enforced by coercion. The stronger party is presumed to act selfishly, ignoring the interests of the 
weaker party. Because this situation is unsatisfactory for the weaker party, he or she often seeks 
to increase his or her power (Emerson, 1962).  
 
Finally, clan governance explains the control mechanisms that rule informal, more loosely 
structured, organizations and groups. Informal socialization processes align individual objectives 
with those of the group (Ouchi, 1979). Members’ behaviors are regulated by group norms 
enforced by interpersonal influence in the group. Consequently, clan governance is rooted in 
theories of interpersonal influence. Clan governance assumes that relationships between group 
members are bilateral and that members aim for social integration. Social integration can be 
achieved in two ways. First, group members identify with the values, attitudes, and behaviors of 
the group, or willingly adopt these, in order to be associated with the group (Tajfel, 1982). 
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Second, members do not necessarily adopt group values, beliefs, and attitudes, but simply 
comply in order to meet the expectations of the group (Ajzen, 1991). In the first case, observance 
of group norms is self-enforced; in the second case, compliance is generally enforced through 
explicit peer pressure. 
 
Typology of Online Governance Structures 
 
Whether these archetypal offline governance structures can be applied to online settings is 
currently unknown. One important consideration is that interactions in an online setting are 
mediated by code. Developers of OCC websites bring communities to life by creating virtual 
space and time and enabling interactions to take place (Grimes, Jaeger, & Fleischmann, 2008). 
Consequently, governance structures that control interactions in OCC are also shaped and 
mediated by technological protocols and codes. Based on a systematic review of the literature 
(see Appendix 1 for an overview), the following section addresses whether and how the 
archetypal trichotomy of offline governance structures can be applied to OCC (see Table 2).  
 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
 
Market Governance  
 
The concept of market governance was developed to explain regulation of financial transactions. 
Financial transactions form the bulk of interactions in online marketplace communities, such as 
Amazon, eBay, and Groupon. Financial transaction communities (Hagel & Armstrong, 1997) 
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can replicate traditional marketplaces, enabling the sale of items at a fixed price to buyers, or 
resemble auction sites, where potential buyers bid for products. In both cases, transactions are 
regulated by pricing mechanisms. In eBay auctions, for example, transaction success and final 
price were shown to be determined by opening price, reserve price, and the number of parties 
engaged in the bidding process (Gilkeson & Reynolds, 2003). Financial transactions are a 
specific form of transaction where a good or service is exchanged against a currency and where 
the exchange rate is called price.  
 
However, transactions can also be non-financial in nature (such as barter and social exchange). 
Examples of OCC that are based on the principle of barter are Thredup, to exchange children’s 
clothes, Swaptree, to exchange music, U-exchange, to exchange services, or Goswap, to swap 
homes. These types of transactions are also governed by market control mechanisms, although 
the mechanism is not fiscal, but some other rate of exchange (e.g. one Bob Dylan record = three 
Ray Charles records). Social exchange of support and information is another type of transaction 
frequently occurring in OCC. It is not only non-financial, but also non-economic, because what 
is transferred is not considered to have economic value. For instance, members of open source 
communities exchange lines of codes to improve software and solve problems (Shah, 2006). 
Within many other communities, members exchange opinions, advice, experiences or support.  
 
The logic underlying social exchange-based interactions has characteristics of both gifting and 
transaction. In the examples given above, reciprocity between the donor and receiver is not 
explicitly required, but there is an expectation of generalized reciprocity whereby the receiver 
feels obliged to reciprocate to the community something of similar value to what was received. 
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Reciprocation does not need to be immediate and the time delay for payback is not explicit. In 
contrast to gifting practice, it is accepted by the exchanging parties that one may interact solely 
out of personal interest (e.g. problem solving, need for information or support). Furthermore, the 
exchange may not lead to relational outcomes, while gifting is traditionally viewed as a relational 
practice. These forms of social exchange are therefore conceptualized as transactional gifts 
(Davies, Whelan, Foley, & Walsh, 2010), or gifting that follows the logic of economic exchange 
(Hollenbeck, Peters, & Zinkhan, 2006). In this article, they are referred to as social transactions. 
 
Transactions take place in a particular legal context, shaped by the social structure in which the 
transactions occurs (Bradach & Eccles, 1989; Humphrey, 2010; Stern & Reve, 1980). OCC are 
bound to a legal context and commercial laws that influence online transactions. Legal 
institutions are a type of third party guaranteeing that transaction rules are compliant with legal 
rules and that they will be enforced. Transacting parties can turn to these institutions in case of 
disputes or problems. The presence of legal rules and overseeing institutions is particularly 
important to OCC because, online, transacting parties perceive a higher risk of deception and 
abuse during negotiation and exchange (Citera, Beauregard, & Mitsuya, 2005). Not surprisingly, 
several researchers have investigated the way OCC transactions are governed through contract 
law (De Zwart & Lindsay, 2009; Fairfield, 2008; Grimes, Jaeger, & Fleischman, 2008; 
Humphreys, 2008; Shah, 2006). Within OCC, legal governance is generally based on the End 
User License Agreement (EULA) or the Terms of Service (ToS), which members agree to before 
joining. EULA and ToS define such issues as intellectual property (copyright), individual 
property on virtual objects, common law, crimes and exchange freedoms. 
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To conclude, members of OCC may engage in financial transactions, barter and social 
transactions. Online market governance is based on rules of exchange defined endogenously to 
the transaction. These rules can include price, non-financial exchange rates, and (in)direct 
reciprocity. Online market governance is also systematically based on legal contracts (EULAs 




The communal characteristics of OCC, like voluntary participation and low exit barriers, led 
some authors to question whether hierarchy governance was applicable. While some claimed that 
hierarchy and its authoritarian rules cannot be imposed in online communities (Watson, 2005), 
several articles account for top-down mechanisms of rule definition and enforcement (e.g. De 
Zwart & Lindsay, 2009; Grimes, Jaeger, & Fleischmann, 2008; Humphreys, 2008; Kollock & 
Smith, 1996). Hierarchy governance is enabled in OCC by awarding technological powers to 
specific members or administrators. For instance, Humphreys (2008) describes the availability of 
surveillance technology for virtual world administrators, adopting spyware that automatically 
identifies behavioral patterns. Other researchers have described situations of hierarchical 
governance in which administrators can impose physical chastisement on players’ avatars (Reid, 
1999; Duval Smith, 1999).  
 
While OCC hierarchy governance is systematically enabled by technological power, it can take 
two forms: despotic hierarchy governance and meritocratic hierarchy governance. Despotism is a 
form of governance in which a single party rules with absolute power and decisions are subject 
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to no restraints or control. When the ruling party is an individual, it is an autocracy. In OCC 
created bottom-up by consumers, technological power is usually in the hands of the founder who 
can modify the community at will. OCC owners are, thus, sometimes referred to as “autocratic 
leaders” (O’Mahonny & Ferraro, 2007), “gods” (Reid, 1999) or “Leviathan” (Kollock & Smith, 
1996). Company or third-party owned OCC are generally not ruled by those who created them. 
The rulers, therefore, do not have the patriarchal legitimacy of individual founders. They rule as 
tyrants, dominating through threat of punishment, and are referred to as ‘dictators’ (De Zwart & 
Lindsey, 2009). Despotic legitimacy in OCC differs from the hierarchical structure defining 
formal organizations in an offline context, or bureaucratic legitimacy (Ouchi, 1979). While the 
first is a given, the second is legally and rationally determined (Weber, 1947). The rights and 
responsibilities of each member of the organization are formulated in writing from relationship 
initiation (legal) to ensure maximum efficiency (rational). Members are thus awarded power 
based on their knowledge and competency.  
 
Meritocracy is a mix of bureaucracy and democracy. The logic is bureaucratic except that 
democratic mechanisms ensure that powerful positions are held by members accepted as leaders 
by the majority (O’Mahonny & Ferraro, 2007). Meritocracy is preferred to bureaucracy in OCC 
as online communities shun top-down hierarchical control although, as with all organizations, 
they need it (O’Mahonny & Ferraro, 2007). For instance, Duval Smith (1999) describes the 
creation of an elaborate democratic election system in an educative multi-user dungeon where 
despotic power was contested. 
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Despotic and meritocratic hierarchy governance structures are not mutually exclusive, but they 
represent different control mechanisms. Reid (1999) describes how technical powers in a virtual 
world were officially awarded based on talent recognized by the community (e.g., 
accomplishment of tasks, ability to create communal bonds). Nevertheless, this meritocratic 
mechanism was tainted with suspicions of favoritism and accusations of prejudice and injustice. 
Less powerful complainants were summarily punished by the more powerful members. 
Similarly, Humphreys (2008) describes Blizzard’s exercise of power in World of Warcraft, 
consisting of tension between despotic methods of punishment and case-by-case meritocratic 
evaluations of member’s activities. 
 
To conclude, hierarchy governance in OCC is enabled by technological rather than 
administrative power and it can be despotic or meritocratic in nature. Those forms of governance 




Clan governance is the most obvious form of governance in OCC because of the voluntary 
nature of OCC adherence and participation, as well as the generally informal and constantly 
evolving community organization. It has received a lot of attention from scholars studying 
governance in online communities, being referred to as a “democratic mode of governance” 
(O’Mahony & Ferraro, 2007), “self-governance” (Forte, Larco, & Bruckman, 2009), “normative 
governance” (Wiertz et al., 2010) and “player-to-player control” (Humphreys, 2008). Clan 
governance control mechanisms, whether online or offline,  integrate members socially, with 
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group norms enforced via peer pressure and self-enforcement (Bagozzi & Dholakia, 2002). 
However, technology-mediation changes the way regulation occurs in OCC.  
 
As in offline groups, all members in OCC may contribute to the development and enforcement of 
group norms, although in practice it is only the posters who are involved in this process. When 
lurkers decide to become contributors, they will be scrutinized by the other members for their 
adherence to group norms. In cases of deviant behavior, community members may reprimand or 
ignore new members. Wiertz et al. (2010) showed that in mature OCC, that host an active group 
of core contributors, it may be quite hard for newly arrived members to achieve social status 
(and, thus, more influence on the norm-setting and development process). This is because 
technological barriers, such as reaching a certain amount of posts, accumulating membership 
length, and developing a distinct, self-branded writing style become harder to overcome.  
 
Normative OCC systems typically fragment due to group heterogeneity. Online, there are fewer 
barriers to community membership: constraints of time and geographic location, economic, and 
social barriers are more easily overcome due to the fact that interaction is technology-mediated 
(De Valck, Van Bruggen, & Wierenga, 2009). As a result, OCC tend to have a member base that 
is more heterogeneous than offline communities. Heterogeneity regularly causes conflicts of 
interest and tribal member fights regarding community norms (De Valck, 2007). Considerable 
heterogeneity makes it difficult to reach consensus on social norms and puts the community at 
risk of implosion.  
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Online communities commonly fragment their normative systems into local sub-systems to 
overcome this difficulty (Kollock & Smith, 1996; Mc William, 2000; Ren, Kraut, & Kiesler, 
2007). Wikipedians self-select into ideological subgroups with diverging beliefs about the way 
the online encyclopedia should function and what its goals should be (Forte, Larco, & 
Bruckman, 2009). Members are also commonly clustered into subgroups with separate 
normative systems based on preferred activities.  Flickr, Wikipedia, and Second Life function in 
this manner (Ren, Kraut, & Kiesler, 2007). Normative systems can also be segmented based on 
members’ level of community experience. Virtual worlds commonly have “newbie gardens” 
where new, less skilled members can practice without the fear of being harassed by powerful 
members (Lampe & Johnston, 2005). Forums are sometimes divided into discussion areas 
directly relevant to the community’s official interests, on the one hand, and areas for off-topic 
discussion on the other. This enables communities to overcome conflicts about topics (Ren, 
Kraut, & Kiesler, 2007). OCC thus have two-tier systems of social norms. The first tier defines 
norms applying to specific areas of the community, while the second tier norms apply to the 
community at large, including norms about how local sub-systems are organized with respect to 
one another. 
  
Normative fragmentation is structured by the technological interface used for interaction (Forte 
Larco, & Bruckman, 2009; Ren, Kraut, & Kiesler, 2007). Website functionalities enable 
members to formally capture elaborate norm systems and articulate them in codes of conduct, 
netiquette and FAQ sections (Kollock & Smith, 1996; Lampe & Johnston, 2005). Messages 
unrelated to the community’s official topic of interest are tagged in the subject line enabling 
members who are not interested to ignore them (Ren, Kraut, & Kiesler, 2007). Text-based 
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communication thus signals to the community that a message was published within the frame of 
a sub-system of norms. The availability of multiple communication media allows the 
development of norms about the segmented usage of each medium. For instance, private 
channels (instant messaging and email) are generally meant for personal discussions between 
online “friends”, while public channels such as forums should be used to discuss expert topics 
directly related to the community’s purpose (Ren, Kraut, & Kiesler, 2007). Similarly, site 
architecture enables segregation of heterogeneous forums into more homogeneous sub-forums, 
enabling norms to emerge. Finally, comment quality in the news site Slashdot is determined by a 
selection of members who rate all the comments published. Readers can choose to only receive 
the messages with the highest average ratings (Lampe & Resnick, 2004). There, automation 
technology enables a community-wide norm of quality which members can adapt to.  
 
To conclude, clan governance is an important form of governance in OCC. Community 
administrators need to both enable and channel clan governance so as to guarantee a healthy 
community in which heterogeneous members settle (cf. Fournier & Lee, 2009). This can be 
achieved by incentivizing posters to design and enforce norms and by ensuring that both general 
and local norms are created. Community administrators need to leverage different specificities of 
technology-mediated communication such as site structure, textual artifacts, diversity of 
communication channels, and automation functionalities to aid this process. 
 
Moderation in Online Communities of Consumption 
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In the previous section, three different OCC governance structures and associated control 
mechanisms were distinguished: market (transaction rules and contract law), hierarchy 
(meritocratic and despotic rules) and clan (group norms). Understanding how these structures 
and control mechanisms translate into actual behaviors is important, as it identifies what must be 
done to establish or administer a certain governance structure. The distinction between 
governance structures and their administration is also conceptually significant as the two do not 
operate at the same level. While the rules of governance structures are primary rules which 
regulate ordinary conduct, the rules defining the administration of governance structures are 
secondary rules which regulate the functioning of governance structures.  
 
Heide (1994) detailed how governance structures can be administered in B2B relationships. He 
developed the concept of “applied governance” which organizes and integrates activities that 
initiate or support governance structures. However, the term “applied governance” is academic, 
and does not resonate with community stakeholders. In the context of OCC, the term 
“moderation” is more salient. Hence, in this article the term “moderation” describes those 
activities carried out by OCC stakeholders that initiate or support governance structures. 
 
Present knowledge of moderation is sparse and fragmented. Online marketing literature typically 
uses the label “community management”. It describes “to-do” lists directed at practitioners, 
largely unrelated to governance theory (Fournier & Lee, 2009; Mc William, 2000; Williams, 
1999; Williams & Cothrel, 2002). Moderation has been investigated in the context of focus 
groups (e.g. Fern, 2001; Langer, 2001) and online communities of learning (e.g. Hlapanis, 
Kordaki, & Dimitrakopoulou, 2006; Vlachopoulos & Cowan, 2010a; 2010b), but these studies 
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are context-dependent, and not pertinent to general OCC governance. For example, Fern (2001) 
discusses contingencies relating research epistemological objectives and research outcomes, 
Hlapanis, Korkadi, and Dimitrakopoulou (2006) discuss the moderator’s influence on student 
learning, and Vlachopoulos and Cowan (2010b) discuss how that effect is moderated by 
pedagogical constraints. Some researchers explicitly investigated aspects of moderation in online 
communities, as part of governance theory, but examined it with respect to a single practice such 
as feedback  (Moon & Sproull, 2008; Lampe & Johnston, 2005; Lampe & Resnick, 2004; Wiertz 
et al., 2010), End-User License Agreement (De Zwart and Lindsay, 2009; Fairfield, 2008; Shah, 
2006) or conflict resolution (Duval-Smith, 1999; Reid, 1999). So, while these studies represent 
important first steps in understanding moderation in OCC, a unified, comprehensive framework 
detailing moderation practices for each form of governance structure (market, hierarchy, and 
clan) is lacking. 
 
Heide (1994) proposed three major dimensions of applied governance: initiation, maintenance 
(consisting of six sub-processes), and termination. The purpose of this section is to ascertain 
whether these dimensions can be used to categorize OCC moderation practices. Heide’s (1994) 




 is the selective entry process into an interaction, involving evaluation of 
the potential interlocutor, initial negotiation about the process of interaction, and preliminary 
adaptation efforts. Interaction Maintenance incorporates six sub-processes: Role Specification, 
Planning, Monitoring, Rewards, Punishments, and Adjustments. Role Specification consists of 
                                                          
1
 Although Heide discusses “relationships”, this article uses the term “interaction” for the OCC context, because 
moderation involves the overseeing of control mechanisms associated with discrete transactions, which are non-
relational in nature. 
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defining the objectives, rights and responsibilities of the different parties engaged in an 
interaction. Planning represents systems by which future contingencies and consequential rights 
and responsibilities are spelled out. Monitoring assesses the quality of the different actors’ 
performance based on their role specification. Rewards are allocated to stakeholders based on the 
monitoring of their behavior. Punishment penalizes stakeholders on the basis of monitoring of 
their behavior. Adjustment Processes are used to adapt the applied governance system to 
changing circumstances. Finally, Interaction Termination is the process by which an interaction 
is brought to an end.   
 
To understand moderation in OCC, a literature review of online community governance and 
social influence was conducted. Following this review, all the moderation concepts and practices 
discussed in the literature applying Heide’s (1994) dimensions of applied governance were 
evaluated.  For a review of the literature used, see Appendix 2. This systematic review reveals 
that Heide’s (1994) applied governance framework provides a useful template for delineating 
moderation practices (see Table 3). The moderation practices associated with each form of 
governance structure (market, hierarchy, and clan) will now be discussed.  
 




Interaction Initiation: Individuals spend time identifying and selecting their exchange partners 
for both economic and social transactions. Profile screening plays a central role in partner 
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selection. In economic transactions, individuals spend time comparing offers, looking for good 
deals, browsing prices, and using a website’s search functionality. Trust and reliability are 
especially important online (Citera, Beauregard, & Mitsuya, 2005). Thus, individuals spend time 
evaluating other parties, reading through individual profiles and paying particular attention to 
past ratings (Gilkeson & Reynolds, 2003). In social transactions, individual profiles are used to 
check whether a person is looking for a specific type of exchange, before initiating contact. For 
instance dating websites, originally meant to build up romantic relationships, are now commonly 
used to organize illicit encounters akin to social transactions. A member of a website looking for 
illicit encounters will look at other people’s profiles to find someone suitable before making 
contact. The type of transactions proposed and their conditions are restricted by a legally-binding 
agreement accepted by all members when joining the website. 
 
Interaction Maintenance: Different names are normally assigned to parties involved in a 
transaction, depending on whether it is an economic or social exchange. The roles of economic 
exchange partners are normally defined as that of a buyer, seller, bidder, if the good is auctioned 
(Gilkeson & Reynolds, 2003), or re-seller if second-hand goods are being exchanged, (Chu & 
Liao, 2007). In social exchanges, individuals are normally called the donor and the receiver 
(Hollenbeck, Peters, & Zinkhan, 2006). In both cases, one party (buyer/receiver) has an 
unfulfilled need and seeks to address that need. The other party (seller/donor) has valuable 
resources, and is ready to share or transfer these in return for economic, psychological or social 
value. In order for the terminology to be equally applicable to economic and social transactions, 
the terms provider and beneficiary are adopted here. Transactions are shaped by regulators who 
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act as both the legislator and judge. Regulators design legally-binding rules for transactions and 
then enforce these rules coercively when appropriate (De Zwart & Lindsay, 2009).  
 
Future contingencies, rights, and responsibilities are often formalized by an End-User License 
Agreement (EULA) and Terms of Service (ToS), Privacy Statements, Community Standards, 
Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ), and User Guidelines. While EULAs and ToS typically 
apply to market governance structures (De Zwart & Lindsay, 2009; Fairfield, 2009; Grimes, 
Jaeger, & Fleischman, 2008; Shah, 2006), Privacy Statements and Community Standards to 
hierarchy governance structures (Grimes, Jaeger, & Fleischman, 2008) and FAQ and User 
Guidelines to clan governance issues (Forte, Larco & Bruckman, 2009; Grimes, Jaeger & 
Fleischmann, 2008; Kollock & Smith, 1996; Lampe & Johnston, 2005), this is not definitive. 
Since OCC generally have a limited number of planning documents and no standardized 
terminology, the documentation varies. However, the rules stated in those documents can be 
systematically classified as dealing with issues related to market, hierarchy or clan governance 
structures depending on the contingencies considered (e.g. transaction vs. relationship related) 
and the manner in which rights and responsibilities are defined (e.g. unilateral vs. bilateral).  
 
Planning systems for market governance transactions define legal rights and legal infringements 
and how to deal with inadequate transactions and transaction failures. The rules vary depending 
on the community. Open-source communities tend to focus on intellectual property rights and the 
specific issues of code ownership, modification and distribution (Shah, 2006). Virtual worlds 
often specify virtual object property rights (Fairfield, 2008). Boundaries of freedom of speech 
and privacy agreements are also often addressed in legal terms (Humphreys, 2008). Regulatory 
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measures for economic transactions, in case of failures, are specified in terms of return and 
reimbursement conditions, and dispute resolution (cf. Gilkeson & Reynolds, 2003). 
Monitoring of market governance structures consists of following up each transaction. In online 
auctions the sales process is monitored by the remaining time in the auction and information on 
the value of the highest bid. In traditional online sales, the conclusion of the deal is confirmed 
via a confirmation email and the delivery of the product via a delivery email. In social 
transactions, it is almost impossible to monitor these processes. 
 
Individuals are rewarded for the accomplishment of their role through positive feedback. 
Feedback can take a formal or informal shape and applies to both economic and social 
transactions. Informal feedback constitutes thanking and congratulating the other party for good 
conduct during the transaction. Formal feedback is common in big OCC. Marketplaces like eBay 
(Gilkeson & Reynolds, 2003) and Amazon use formal feedback. Feedback is also commonly 
used in peer-to-peer problem solving communities (Moon & Sproull, 2008; Wiertz  et al., 2010). 
Positive feedback is a source of psychological gratification. However, it also provides social 
gratification since feedback aggregates are publicly available on most sites. Feedback can thus be 
used as a means to build reputation and status in a community (Moon & Sproull, 2008; Wiertz et 
al., 2010). 
 
Parties whose transactional experiences are negative can voice and punish other parties via 
negative feedback (Gilkeson & Reynolds, 2003; Moon & Sproull, 2008; Wiertz et al., 2010).  
Negative feedback acts as a psychological deterrent to misconduct but also as a social deterrent, 
since it can function as a form of shaming. Regulators can also punish misbehavior by banning 
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individuals (Humphreys, 2008) or imposing reimbursement in cases of transaction failure, as 
specified in regulatory documents. 
 
Communication and transaction functionalities must be adapted to resolve glitches and remain 
abreast of the latest communication usage. The legal context within which transactions take place 
(EULA/ToS) might also need updating. This requires collaboration between the regulators and 
developers, and possibly other community stakeholders (Humphreys, 2008; Williams & Cothrel, 
2002). 
 
Interaction Termination: transactions encapsulated by market governance structures are 
terminated as soon as the reciprocal transfer of value is finished. This happens abruptly and there 




Interaction Initiation: In closed communities administrators approve or reject applicants who 
want to become community members. The process usually starts with the member applying 
spontaneously or via a sponsor. However, the administrator can also be the first to reach out to 
individuals asking them to join to grow the community. This is common in brand communities 
managed by professional community managers. The administrator evaluates the applicant’s 
profile and motivation to join to determine if membership in the group is granted. Selection is 
meritocratic if a potential member is evaluated based on his or her ability to serve the long-term 
viability and animation of the community, and despotic if it is based on an applicant’s ability to 
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serve the administrator’s private interests. For example, in a dating community specializing in 
executives, a meritocratic administrator would try to recruit executive-level men to decrease the 
imbalance of male and female member count. A despotic administrator by contrast would recruit 
men she finds attractive, male friends looking for a wealthy partner, irrespective of their social 
status, and female colleagues who asked her to let them in although they are not executives. In 
all cases, negotiation of unfavorable decisions is at the whim of the administrator. 
 
Interaction Maintenance: In a hierarchical relationship, role specification involves defining who 
the controller is and who the controlled person is. In OCC, controllers are generally called 
administrators (Reid, 1999; Duval Smith, 1999; Ren, Kraut, & Kiesler, 2007), community 
managers (Fournier & Lee, 2009; Grimes, Jaeger, & Fleischman, 2008; Humphreys, 2008; Ren, 
Kraut, & Kiesler, 2007; Williams, 1999; Williams & Cothrel, 2002), moderators (Lampe & 
Johnston, 2005; Lampe & Resnick, 2004) or leaders (O’Mahonny & Ferraro, 2007). In this 
article, the label administrator is adopted.  The role of administrators is similar in despotic and 
meritocratic hierarchical structures. They ensure that the rules of the community are respected 
(Duval Smith, 1999; Humphreys, 2008; Reid, 1999), manage information overload (Lampe & 
Johnston, 2005; Lampe & Resnick, 2004), and nurture community interactions (Humphreys, 
2008). However, despotic and meritocratic administrators differ in the scope of their power. 
Despotic administrators have virtually unlimited power while meritocratic administrators are 
limited in their action by a number of democratic processes, i.e. members can veto their 
decisions (O’Mahonny & Ferraro, 2007). 
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Planning systems for relationships regulated by hierarchy governance structures define the rights 
and responsibilities of administrators and members, and how inappropriate behaviors are dealt 
with (O’Mahonny & Ferraro, 2007). Hierarchical planning systems usually take the shape of 
community standards. They are not legally-binding, but are the equivalent of internal law or 
organizational rules within the virtual space of the OCC (Grimes, Jaeger, & Fleischman, 2008). 
They are very often written in an elusive manner due to the high contextualization of the 
problems addressed (Grimes, Jaeger, & Fleischman, 2008). In virtual worlds, members are 
granted fundamental freedoms in terms of freedom of speech and expression, freedom from 
search and seizure, freedom from unnecessary harm, and ability to seek redress for grievances. 
However, members have to abide by the rules of the community. Administrators are responsible 
for informing users about the types of data collected and data access rights (Grimes, Jaeger, & 
Fleischman, 2008), which they can modify at any time as long as members’ legal rights are not 
violated. OCC often have highly codified procedures about sanctions for member misbehavior 
and how administrators should resolve member conflicts (Kollock & Smith, 1996; O’Mahonny 
& Ferraro, 2007). Conflicting parties can submit disputes to administrators for informal 
(mediation) or formal (fact finding and arbitration) resolution (Duval Smith, 1999). Online 
conflict resolution can take unique forms due to technological help. Duval Smith (1999) reported 
use of two virtual bodies in different rooms to mediate between members who refused to meet. 
Physical distance also enables individuals to receive external advice during conflict resolution 
discussion.  
 
Administrators can monitor members’ activity both manually and via automated website 
functionalities. Monitoring generally involves spending time reading discussions to develop 
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subjective judgments about dubious behaviors. However, administrators are often assisted by 
technological tools. Humphreys (2008) highlighted the use of spyware in virtual worlds, enabling 
community management to identify and tackle deviant behaviors. This includes inappropriate 
language filters, to identify problematic conversations, or “report to moderators” buttons where 
users flag specific content for the attention of moderators. Such buttons are common in most 
forums.  
 
Administrators can reward community members for good behavior in two ways. First, they can 
reward performance. Williams (1999) talked of “making expertise visible”. This can be achieved 
by giving out reputation points (Lampe & Resnick, 2004) and badges, publishing user ranking 
and leader boards (Dellarocas, 2010; Ren, Kraut, & Kiesler, 2007), organizing the election of the 
best members of the community, or granting special powers (Dellarocas, 2010). In forums, 
administrators commonly make threads sticky or move them to high status sub-areas such as 
“classic threads”. High performers who contribute significantly to the community can also be 
awarded formal responsibilities (Duval Smith, 1999; O’Mahonny & Ferraro, 2007; Dellarocas, 
2010). Second, administrators can reward effort. Informal leaders can be rewarded for their 
engagement via training (Mc William, 2000; Williams, 1999). Newbies can be welcomed (Mc 
William, 2000; Ren, Kraut, & Kiesler, 2007) and then trained via FAQ and mentoring (Lampe 
and Johnston, 2005).  
 
Administrators also punish deviant behaviors. Typical deviant behaviors are harassment of 
administrators, inappropriate language, exploitation of bugs and technical glitches, and malicious 
attacks on other members (Grimes, Jaeger, & Fleischman, 2008). Administrators punish deviant 
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members by paralyzing, exiling or banning them (Duval Smith, 1999; Reid, 1999). They also 
have the power to edit discussion threads for censorship purposes or to keep them on topic. They 
can close threads, archive them, and open-sub-areas of discussion. Finally they arbitrate serious 
conflicts when mediation is not possible (Duval Smith, 1999). Administrators typically distribute 
sanctions through a graduated system whereby severity of the sanction depends on the gravity, 
intentionality and repetitious nature of the offense (Kollock & Smith, 1996). 
 
Hierarchical moderation generally consists of top-down unilateral processes, and is thus difficult 
to align with adjustment systems. Still, Lampe & Resnick (2004) discussed the creation of meta-
administrators (“metamoderators”) who evaluate the quality of administrators’ (”moderators’”) 
evaluations of comments. Administrators appraised as fair gain administrative power while those 
appraised as unfair lose administrative power, and possibly their administrator status. Grimes, 
Jaeger, & Fleischman (2008) further recommended members of virtual worlds to gather in 
groups similar to trade unions and organize revolts and boycotts to pressure virtual world 
administrators. 
 
Interaction Termination: Hierarchical relationship termination can be due to the exclusion of a 
member by the administrator, or the suppression of the administrator’s hierarchical status. 
Member exclusion is arbitrary, without any formal explanation (in despotic systems) or based on 
clear rational-legal reasons (in meritocratic systems). In both cases, the effects of exclusion are 
immediate and harsh since the banned member is instantly unable to enter the community. 
Administrators might even remove all traces of the member (e.g. avatars) from the community 
(Duval Smith, 1999). The decision can be difficult to enforce if a member is reluctant to depart 
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the community. Banned members can create new virtual identities and reintegrate the platform 
until their discovery (Duval Smith, 1999). Relationship termination can also be due to an 
administrator’s loss of status. This could be the result of planned administrator turnover 
(Williams, 1999) or unplanned adjustment. Administrator’s dismissal is generally based on 
meritocratic grounds, with communities aiming to hire a more competent person for the job. Of 




Interaction initiation: In communal relationships governed by clan governance structures, 
interactions are generally initiated spontaneously, out of interest for a particular discussion. After 
a few exchanges, members develop an opinion on the compatibility of interests, beliefs and 
values of the discussion partners. They may also screen member profile pages to learn more 
about their background (Dellarocas, 2010; Ren, Kraut, & Kiesler, 2007). If the OCC includes 
social networking functionalities, members may also formally connect. 
 
Interaction maintenance: Members posting in OCC generally engage in relationships with 
various other members. Group dynamics lead to the emergence of diverse social roles (e.g. Forte, 
Larco, & Bruckman, 2009; Reid, 1999). The most complete and least context-dependent description 
is probably that of Fournier and Lee (2009), featuring no less than 18 online community roles. 
Each social role performs a specific function for the group.  To name a few, ambassadors 
promote the community to outsiders, historians preserve the community memory and codify 
rituals and rites, and mentors teach others and share expertise. Playing these roles provides social 
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status and recognition which in turn enables members to create and enforce community norms 
(Campbell, Fletcher, & Greenhill, 2009). Individuals enter into social roles due to hard skills, i.e. 
their capability to perform particular tasks; or soft skills, i.e. their ability to socialize and become 
popular (Reid, 1999). Social power can be mixed with technical power so that clan governance 
roles are combined with hierarchy governance roles (c.f. Forte, Larco, & Bruckman, 2009; Reid, 
1999).  
 
Social norms, defining what appropriate behavior is and how misbehavior should be dealt with, 
often are not formally stated in OCC.  Normative regulation in OCC is based on implicit rules 
that have been developed over time. Nevertheless, when social norms are contested, vehement 
discussions between members or member groups may occur. Because these discussions are 
archived, they remain, in principle, accessible forever and, thus, allow new members to learn 
about the ins and outs of OCC life. Usually, key social norms end up as part of the user 
guidelines, netiquettes, mission statements and FAQ pages (Lampe & Johnston, 2005; Ren, 
Kraut, & Kiesler, 2007). While those documents generally define a limited number of norms 
applying to the website at large, sophisticated systems may develop, specifying norms at both the 
general and the local level. In Wikipedia, for example, any user can post behavioral 
recommendations on the guideline pages, and if the recommendation “sticks” it becomes a norm. 
The website thus has an impressive number of written social norms defining appropriate 
behavior and how to react in cases of misbehavior (Forte, Larco, & Bruckman, 2009).  
 
In OCC, members have a number of ways to monitor each other’s behaviors. Of course, the most 
direct form of monitoring occurs when members interact. This is facilitated online by the 
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persistence of interactions on web pages enabling members to “go back in history” (Kollock & 
Smith, 1996). However, there are also indirect ways to assess other members’ level of 
community engagement. First, profile pages usually contain information about the length of 
membership, the number of contributions, and the number of discussion threads started 
(Dellarocas, 2010). Within social networking sites and on (micro-)blogs, the number of friends, 
followers, or blog roll contacts gives an indication of social connection and community 
integration. Finally, badges are an indication of the social role(s) a member has taken up, and 
show how well he or she is performing.    
 
Rewards are distributed informally based on output or effort. Reward of output happens through 
members praising contributions of others when they find these informative, supportive or 
entertaining. Reward of effort typically occurs through mentoring activities (Lampe & Johnston, 
2005; Williams & Cothrel, 2002; Ren, Kraut, & Kiesler, 2007), such as welcoming new 
members and explaining how the quality of contributions is judged in the community, and 
helping out in case of difficulties. Punishments are also distributed informally. Sometimes, peers 
simply inform the deviant of the norm being disrespected, although they can also mock or insult 
(Kollock & Smith, 1996). Adjustment of group identity and values in clan governance happens 
through constant negotiation between members. Over time, this negotiation leads to important 
transformations in the normative control system. For instance, O’Mahonny & Ferraro (2007) 
described the progressive appreciation of organizational rather than technical contributions in the 
Debian community and how this transformed leadership in the community. Wiertz et al. (2010) 
discussed the progressive emergence of disdain for new comers in a peer-to-peer problem 
solving community. 




Interaction termination: In communal relationships, interaction termination can be formal or 
informal. Informal relationship breaks consist of no longer directly communicating with the 
other party, perhaps even no longer participating in the same discussion threads. A formal 
relationship break involves using functionalities to automatically prevent interactions with the 
other person. Older OCC platforms (e.g. Usenet, mailing lists, multi-user dungeons, Kollock & 
Smith, 1996; Reid, 1999) and even some more recent forums (e.g. News sites such as Slashdot, 
Lampe and Resnick, 2004) commonly use “kill files”, i.e.  ignore lists, which enable members to 
black list certain contributors and no longer view their posts. Platforms with social networking 




The previous section has adapted Heide’s (1994) applied governance framework to provide a 
theoretical structure for moderation practices in OCC. Whereas this structure closely follows 
Heide’s conceptualization, it significantly differs from Heide’s framework in the form that 
governance practices take up due to the technology-enabled environment of OCC. As such, this 
paper has extended and enriched the original framework. 
 
Interaction initiation incorporates careful interlocutor selection. Under market governance, 
individuals check potential partners’ transaction histories. In hierarchy governance, individuals 
check for a potential member’s right to access the community’s virtual space. This leads to 
granting (or not granting) the person the technological power to access the platform. In clan 
Governance and Moderation in Online Communities of Consumption 
33 
 
governance, individual profile pages are used to evaluate the compatibility of user identities, 
interests, and values. 
 
Interaction maintenance roles are mostly specific to the online environment. Individuals in OCC 
adopt the roles of providers and beneficiaries interacting under the control of the regulator. In 
hierarchical relationships parties are administrators and members, while in clan relationships up 
to 18 different functional roles have been identified. Planning is centered on online documents 
such as EULAs, Terms of Service, codes of conduct, user guidelines, and FAQs. They define the 
rules governing behavior and deviation in the context of OCC within a legal, organizational or 
normative frame depending on the type of governance structure. Monitoring of members’ 
activities is typically performed by humans, often enabled by different technological 
functionalities including bidding monitoring systems for markets, big brother-like software in 
hierarchies, and badges in clans. Rewards and punishments are specific for each type of 
governance structure; differing from technology-enabled feedback, to posts that informally carry 
positive or negative valence, to granting or reducing technological power, and to giving special 
status to contributions.  Finally, adjustment processes enable the transformation of moderation.  
Interaction termination follows specific steps in hierarchy and clan governance. In both cases, 
technology specific to the online environment allows for the suppression of members’ capacity 
to access the community, the termination of administrators’ powers, and the possibility to 








This article provides a coherent vocabulary to conceptualize governance systems in OCC. It also 
offers a holistic framework to articulate the different elements of OCC governance. In particular, 
it contributes to the body of knowledge on OCC governance in three ways. First, it uses seminal 
typologies in governance theory to bring together the different types of structural control 
mechanisms identified in the literature into a typology of online governance structures: market 
(transaction mechanisms and law), hierarchy (despotic and meritocratic rules) and clan (group 
norms). Second, it differentiates governance structures, the regulation of ordinary behaviors, 
from moderation, the regulation of governance structures, and characterizes moderation.  It 
adapts Heide’s (1994) concept of “applied governance” to OCC to characterize how governance 
structures are organized and administered through moderation strategies. While moderation in 
OCC is organized around the same eight processes as applied governance (interaction initiation, 
interaction maintenance - role specification, planning, monitoring, reward, punishment and 
adjustment - and interaction termination), each dimension takes a different form in OCC due to 
the technology-mediated environment. Third, all instances in which moderation practices have 
been described in the existing OCC literature have been analyzed and conceptually related to one 
of three types of governance structures and a particular control mechanism. The resulting unified 
framework of OCC governance demonstrates that each type of governance structure requires a 
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This article is of interest to community managers and digital marketers collaborating closely with 
OCC. It provides a template illustrating how to overcome situations where individuals and the 
group have divergent interests. The framework goes beyond “dos and don’ts” lists and provides a 
valuable typology of influence practices grounded in robust governance theory. Community 
managers are advised to select influence methods depending on whether they want to nurture 
transactions, to strengthen hierarchy, or to strengthen specific group norms. In each case, 
community managers should review role specifications, planning, monitoring, rewarding, 




The theoretical framework presented paves the way for a number of further investigations. First 
is the development of a contingent theory of governance in OCCs. This article maps out the 
governance structures and the dimensions of moderation which community managers can use to 
align the interests of individual members with those of the group. However, different 
organizational circumstances require different responses (Zeithaml, Varadarajan, & Zeithaml, 
1988). One moderation practice aimed at resolving one type of social dilemma does not 
necessarily resolve the problem in other situations. For example, new members want to 
contribute new ideas to OCC, but their contributions may create information overload in the 
group because of the potentially inappropriate form and the volume of their contributions. The 
interests of one type of member are thus contrary to the interests of the group. A common 
approach to solve this social dilemma is to create a decentralized feedback system where 
members grade one another’s contribution, and in which the presentation of comments is 
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organized from the highest to the lowest grades, thus facilitating information selection and 
processing for each user. While Moon and Sproull (2008) found that this is an effective 
moderation system, Lampe and Resnick (2004) showed that it can make low quality 
contributions more visible depending on the volume and timeliness of feedback. Wiertz et al. 
(2010) further indicated that feedback systems can have negative indirect effects and foster 
negative attitudes towards new members. This may result in discouraging newcomers from 
continuing in the community, and thus, jeopardize the long term viability of the community. A 
contingent theory would thus identify the conditions under which a moderation practice leads to 
social dilemma resolution. 
 
Different types of contingencies could be discussed. The first contingency determines the 
primary type of governance structure that would be regulating members’ behavior. Community 
purpose should be an important variable in this respect. In transaction communities (Hagel & 
Armstrong, 1996) and peer-to-peer problem solving communities (Wiertz et al., 2010), 
interactions are predominantly transactional and should therefore be regulated via market 
governance. In contrast, open-source communities and production communities (O’Mahonny & 
Ferraro, 2007) focus on collaboration toward a common output. Hierarchic decisions are 
therefore regularly taken to coordinate (O’Mahonny & Ferraro, 2007) and resolve conflict (Jehn, 
1995) so that interactions are predominantly regulated by hierarchy governance. In communities 
of interest (Hagel & Armstrong, 1997) individuals join to socialize with like-minded individuals 
resulting in interactions being governed by clan governance. Member purpose arguably 
combines with community purpose to determine which governance structure should regulate 
behavior in a particular social dilemma. In open source communities, the majority of members 
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interact for transactional purposes, but the minority of highly-involved members perceives their 
activity as a hobby and contributes for fun (Shah, 2006). Similarly, on auction sites, some 
consumers sell products for economic purposes, but others do so to socialize and have fun (Chu 
& Liao, 2007). In virtual worlds meant for socialization and play, like Second Life or World of 
Warcraft, some members primarily contribute for transactional purposes (Grimes, Jaeger & 
Fleischmann, 2008). Generally, recent members contribute for transactional purposes, while 
senior active members contribute to socialize (Kozinets, 1999). Therefore, recent members’ 
interactions are regulated by market governance, while those of senior active members are 
regulated by clan governance. Community life cycles should also combine with community and 
member purpose to determine which governance structure regulates behavior in a particular 
social dilemma. O’Mahonny and Ferraro (2007) described hierarchy shifts from despotic in the 
nascent stage of the community to meritocratic in the growth and maturity stages. However, the 
evolution of market and clan governance, and the relative importance of each type of governance 
over time, has not been investigated.  
 
A second set of contingencies determines which dimensions of moderation community managers 
should focus on to solve social dilemmas. In cases of information overload, does the solution lie 
in recruiting newcomers differently (i.e. relationship initiation), ensuring newcomers and senior 
members are satisfied (i.e. relationship maintenance) or excluding certain newcomers and 
aggressive senior members (relationship termination)? If community managers aim to keep 
everyone satisfied, should they enforce norms via punishment or reward? While different 
situations require different practices, a contingent approach to the use of moderation is missing. 
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A second main avenue for further research involves revealing interactions between the different 
types of governance structures identified. Statically this would mean characterizing real-life 
hybrid governance structures which mix market, hierarchy and clan governance. Bradach and 
Eccless’s (1989), for instance, characterized franchising as a hybrid system in offline 
organizations. Their work could be used to guide further research in OCC governance. 
Interactions between governance structures could also be investigated dynamically. This would 
involve characterizing how governance structures influence one another. For example, in a B2B 
context, micro-social contracts were shown to reduce the amount of opportunism occurring 
under market governance (Heide, Wathne, & Rokkan, 2007). Future research could examine how 
this mechanism applies in an OCC context, other possible forms of interaction, and whether the 
different mechanisms complement or supplement one another? 
 
A third fruitful avenue for research would be to characterize fragmented normative systems 
within clan governance and to investigate how different types impact group dynamics. At one 
extreme, social norms apply to every member of the community. At the other extreme, control is 
personalized for every individual. For instance, does interaction termination mean that no one 
can interact with a misbehaving member, or do kill files, when controlled individually, enable 
people to choose whether or not to “ban” a member? Between these extremes lies a range of 
possibilities to segment OCC into sub-groups governed by different rules. While fragmented 
social norm governance is present, it is not clear how many forms of fragmentation exist and 
how they impact members’ behavior. 
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Fourth, hierarchy governance is a particularly interesting phenomenon in OCC as online 
community members are generally wary of it and members’ relationship to hierarchy has been 
very much under researched so far. A number of questions in this area would be interesting to 
investigate. One is whether to have paid or voluntary administrators. Professional administration 
guarantees constant control and strict moderation, but professional administration typically lacks 
communal legitimacy and the administrative stance of paid moderators might impede the 
development of group feelings. A second question is to determine whether administrators should 
be partial or impartial and the consequences for the community. If administrators are impartial in 
conflicts, they become the voice of justice and their decisions are legitimate. However, taking the 
side of a particular group or a certain type of behavior is also a way to construct group identity or 
norms. A third question regards the consequences of censorship. Censorship can occur before or 
after publishing, involving the administrators only or the wider community with members 
flagging inappropriate content. What is the effect of the different types of formal censorship on 




The study of offline governance has provided theoretical and empirical support for the existence 
of three major forms of governance systems: market, hierarchy and clan. However, whether these 
systems translate into the context of OCC has remained unknown. This article sets out to 
determine whether the trichotomy of offline governance structures is relevant to OCC, and also 
whether moderation practices in OCC could be classified according to typologies present in the 
offline literature. Both the trichotomy and the offline classification of applied governance 
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(termed moderation here) were found to be useful templates and enabled the creation of a unified 
framework of OCC governance. This framework details both the overarching governance 
structures and their respective control mechanisms, together with relevant moderation practices. 
The framework provides community stakeholders with a valuable tool to guide the management 
of OCC, enabling the selection of the most appropriate form of governance, commensurate with 
OCC objectives. As a result of the development of this framework, numerous avenues for future 
research in the area of OCC governance have been identified. These should provide the area with 
sufficient impetus to enable its continued future development as a valuable stream of research. 
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Table 2: Governance Structures and Associated Control Mechanisms in OCC














Initiation of interaction - Parties screen profile  
looking  for a 
trustworthy party 
- Contract predefines 
transaction conditions 
Administrator 
recruits the most 
competent 
individuals 






best fitting his or 
her interests 
(no selection in 
open communities) 
- Members engage 
in spontaneous 
exchanges 









- Seeks to address an 
unfulfilled need 
Provider 
- Seeks to transfer a 
resource in exchange for 
some sort of value 
Regulator 
- Legislator: designs 
legally binding rules of 
transaction 
- Judge: enforces rules 
 
Administrator 
- Ensures rules are respected 
- Manages information overload 
- Promotes interactions 
 Regular member 
- Abides rules 
Functional roles 
Members perform 
the main social 




 - Define property law, 
privacy and boundaries 
of freedom 
- Define regulatory 








- Define members’ duties and rights: 
rules and fundamental freedoms 
-  Define administrator’s duties and 
rights : inform about data collection and 
access practices and  freedom to modify 
planning systems 
- Define regulatory processes: sanctions 
for member misbehavior, conflict 
resolution procedures 
- Define group 
norms and how to 
deal with norm 
violation in a 
variety of contexts 
Monitoring Follow up of the 
transaction process via 
bidding monitoring 
systems and automated 
email(economic 
 - Read discussion for subjective 
assessment 
- Use behavior tracking software 
- Read discussion 
for subjective 
assessment 
- Use profile 
information to 
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transactions only) assess engagement 
and integration 




Rewards - Provide positive 
feedback formally or 
informally 
 - Reward performance: 
Distribute reputation points and badges, 
publish leader boards, award 
responsibilities, assign special status to 
particular posts and threads  
- Reward effort: train leaders and 
newbies 




- Reward effort: 
mentoring 
newbies 
Punishments - Provide negative 
feedback 
- Banning 
- Reimbursement  
- Graded sanctions: paralyze, exile 
- Edit, move, close, archive threads and 
sub-areas of discussion 
- Arbitrate conflicts 




- Processes for code 
improvement 





- Groups of users 
gather as trade 
unions and 
organize boycotts 
and revolts  
- Negotiation of 
group values and 
identity 
Interaction termination   - Ban member or 
replace 
administrator 
based on rational 
grounds 
- Ban member ban 
or replace 
administrator 
based on arbitrary 
grounds 
- Choose not to 
interact 
- Unfollow, 
unfriend, add to 
kill  file 
 
Table 3: Moderation (Applied Governance) in Online Communities of Consumption, by Type of Governance Structure














Bagozzi & Dholakia, 2002 Marketing Communities of interest      
Chu & Liao, 2007 Marketing Communities of transaction Implied     
Dellarocas, 2010 Marketing Online communities in general    Implied Implied 
De Zwart & Lindsay, 2009 Internet Studies Virtual worlds      
Duval Smith, 1999 Sociology Multi-user dungeons      
Fairfield, 2008 Law Virtual worlds      
Forte, Larco, & Bruckman, 2009 Information systems Wikipedia      
Fournier & Lee, 2009 Marketing Brand communities    Implied Implied 
Gilkeson  & Reynolds, 2003 Marketing Communities of transaction      
Grimes, Jaeger, & Fleischmann, 
2008 
Information systems Virtual worlds  
    
Humphreys, 2008 Cultural Studies Virtual worlds Implied     
Kollock & Smith, 1996 Sociology Bulletin board (Usenet)      
Lampe & Resnick, 2004 Information systems News site    Implied   
Lampe & Johnston, 2005 Information systems News site    Implied  
Mc William, 2000 Marketing Brand communities    Implied  
Moon & Sproull, Information Systems Peer-to-peer problem solving Implied     
O’Mahonny & Ferraro, 2007 Management Open source communities      
Ren, Kraut, & Kiesler, 2007 Management Online communities in general    Implied  
Reid, 1999 Sociology Multi-user dungeons     Implied 
Shah, 2006 Management Open source communities      
Wiertz et al., 2010 Marketing Peer-to-peer problem solving Implied     
Williams & Cothrel, 2002 Management Online communities in general    Implied Implied 
Williams, 1999 Management Online communities in general Implied   Implied  
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